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Abstract. This article presents analyses of three common social cognitions embraced by many 
representatives of political authority concerning aspects of the war on terrorism with global reach. 
 
Assuming thought informs and even impels action, we might also assume that what representatives of 
formal political authority think about what works in the war on terrorism with global reach merits 
attention. If what they think appears to be problematic concerning how the world works, then what 
they do in the war may be as well. The following are three examples. 
 
Airport Security. Airport workers arrested for lying on employment applications or for making or for 
using forged identity or even security documents are being trotted out as examples of success in the war 
on terrorism. The thinking of political authority’s representatives behind this linkage of arrest and 
success against terrorism is ultimately that anyone who engages in any misbehavior is more likely to be 
a terrorist threat or exploited by terrorists towards the exploitation of terrorist operations. A recent 
quote cited by Glaberson (2003) exemplifies this thinking--viz., “When it comes to airport security, we 
shouldn’t even tolerate the littlest lie.” 
 
But all people lie. All people engage in misbehavior. And almost all of them do not engage in terrorism 
or become exploited by terrorists. Furthermore, a look at the individuals caught up in the arrests 
suggests that they may be even less likely than non-arrestees to become terrorist threats. Many of them 
are seeking to improve themselves and their families economically, view their employment as a 
significant step up, and are loath to endanger this step. Arrest and associated noxious treatment might 
even exacerbate their terrorist potential. In addition, a related social cognition of political authority’s 
representatives that goes back to the 2001 Aviation Security and Transportation Act is that individuals 
who are not United States (US) citizens are more likely to be security risks than citizens who are--a 
cognition that belies the appreciation of most non-citizens for what the US has to offer and the 
phenomenon of many citizens taking what the US has to offer for granted. 
 
Terrorism Contingent on a United States-Led Attack on Iraq. One social cognition undergirding 
arguments used by representatives of political authority who are opponents of a US-led military 
intervention against Iraq is that a consequence will be increased terrorism against the US and its allies 
domestically and internationally. A recent quote by the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, 
and cited in The New York Times (March 8, 2003) exemplifies this--viz., “Is it a matter of fighting 
terrorism? War would only increase it. And we would then be faced with a new wave of violence.” 
 
Unfortunately, one well-validated terrorism-related cognition is that acting in accordance with terrorist 
desires--especially when the rationale for such action is made explicit--increases the probability that 
terrorism will occur again. In de Villepin’s quote, a United Nations (UN) initiative should not occur 
because of what terrorist might do--a high probability maneuver to condition future UN decision making 
within terrorist desire and to help ensure a very long war against terrorism. 
 
1
: Social Cognitions on the War on Terrorism with Global Reach
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2003
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
2 
 
Smallpox Vaccinations. In December 2002, US federal representatives directed that 500,000 health-care 
workers be administered a smallpox vaccine within 30 days to help care for victims of a posited 
bioterrorism attack with smallpox. To mitigate against fears that medical complications from the vaccine 
would be handled appropriately, these representatives have proposed about a quarter of a million 
dollars payment for each person who dies or is completely disabled from the vaccine. Other casualties 
from the vaccination would receive up to $50,000. In this way, health-care workers would comply and 
receive their vaccinations. 
 
Yet, according to Pear (2003), only about 12,400 health-care workers have been vaccinated after about 
7 weeks. A partial explanation for this may be that cognitions crucial to vaccination compliance have not 
been adequately addressed by representatives of political authority. Such cognitions would include 
perceptions of being coerced that induce reactance towards directives; of there being insufficient threat 
of smallpox bioterrorism; of there being no assurance of full financial coverage of medical 
complications; and of many idiosyncratic beliefs that population segments harbor about vaccinations, 
smallpox, terrorism, and myriad aspects of the contemporary world--body, mind, and soul. 
 
An observation related to the above three analyses is that public policy in the war on terrorism with 
global reach must have a significant psychological basis to facilitate success. (See Glaberson, W. (March 
7, 2003). Mixed record in prosecuting airport security violations. The New York Times, pp.A1, A14; In the 
delegates’ words: Hawks and doves debate at the Security Council. The New York Times, p. A9; 
Liberman, J.D. (1999). Terror management, illusory correlation, and perceptions of minority groups. 
Basic & Applied Social Psychology, 21, 13-23; McGregor, I., & Zanna, M. P., Holmes, J. G., & Spencer, S. J. 
(2001). Compensatory conviction in the face of personal uncertainty: Going to extremes and being 
oneself. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 80, 472-488; Montiel, C. J., & Anuar, M. K. (2002). 
Other terrorisms, psychology, and media. Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8, 201-206; 
Pear, R. (March 7, 2003). Officials seek smallpox compensation fund. The New York Times, p. A13.) 
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